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Simmel’s (Non-Human) Humanism: 
On Simmel’s ‘Ethics of Endings and Futures’ 
 
I 
 
Simmel’s Contemporary Relevance 
 
Given the recent non-human turn in sociology and the social sciences, the popularity 
of theories of entanglement, and contemporary concern with the concept of the 
anthropocene, it is easy to forget that classical sociology was always-already aware 
of the relationship between humanity and non-humanity. Although Daniel Chernilo 
focuses upon the debate between Sartre and Heidegger in his recent Debating 
Humanity (2017), and contrasts Sartre’s Existentialism is a Humanism (1947 / 2007) 
with Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism (1947 / 1998) to frame his exploration of the 
limits of the human in contemporary theory, we could easily locate the same concern 
with the human and its relationship to the non-human in Marx, Tarde, and centrally 
for the purposes of this article, Simmel.  
 
As John Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett (2017) have recently shown, Marx’s 
critique of capitalism was essentially founded upon a theory of the alienation of 
humanity from nature and its participation in non-human ecological systems. After 
Marx, and towards the end of the 19th century, Tarde set out a ‘universal sociology’ 
to reflect the social dimension of existence itself in his Monadology and Sociology 
(1893 / 2012). According to this theory everything, including cosmological bodies, 
are implicated in the social, understood in its broadest possible sense. I think we find 
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a similar theory running through Simmel’s work from his classic The Philosophy of 
Money (1900 / 2011) through his Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (1907 / 2011) up to 
his final work The View of Life (1918 / 2015). In these works ideas of relationality, 
becoming, and the implication of humanity in life in itself are central and show how it 
is possible to re-read Simmel’s classical sociology for the present where sociologists 
have come to understand that we can no longer separate human society and the 
humanised world from nature, the environment, and what Eugene Thacker (2011) 
calls the (non-human) planet. As Matthias Gross (2001) has shown, long before 
Chernilo’s attempt to fuse sociology and philosophy Simmel had already imagined a 
‘philosophical sociology’, ‘sociological philosophy’, or ‘sociological metaphysics’ 
capable of understanding the world in terms of infinite relationality and the co-
participation of the human and non-human in existence.  
 
Based upon this insight concerning the relevance of Simmel’s work for 
understanding our ‘entangled present’, the purpose of this article is to explore 
Simmel’s work and recent interpretations of his sociology that seek to project 
Simmelian thought into the future in significantly different ways. To this end in the 
following section of the article I seek to understand Simmel’s contemporary 
relevance through the lens of Finnish sociologist Oli Pyyhtinen’s (2018) recent work 
on the Simmelian legacy. Here, I compare and contrast Pyyhtinen’s (2015) ‘more-
than-human’ sociology with his (2018) reading of Simmel’s influence upon the 
sociological tradition, before moving on to explore Gregor Fitzi’s (2018) focus on 
Simmel’s ethics in individualism in the third section of the paper. While there is a 
sense in which this focus on self-making traps Simmel inside an endless struggle 
between the hypertrophy of the social form and atrophy of the desperate individual 
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and in the process conjures the idea of Simmel as a kind of proto-existentialist, Tom 
Kemple (2018) seeks to explode this opposition through an exploration of Simmel’s 
religiosity. This reading of Kemple, which imagines the identity of self and society 
and the emergence of a ‘comprehensive culture’ that unifies subjective and objective 
culture, concludes the third section of the article. Finally, in the conclusion to the 
piece, I take up David Beer’s (2019) recent reading of Simmel’s final works in order 
to consider his apocalyptic non-human humanism, which I suggest represents 
Simmel’s key contribution to contemporary sociological concerns relating to 
specifically moving beyond the looming catastrophe of the anthropocene and ‘our’ 
post-human humanism that offers no kind of future at all.    
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II 
 
Simmel and Strangeness 
 
In his More-Than-Human Sociology (2015), Olli Pyyhtinen writes about the need for 
sociology to think beyond the human and understand relationality in non-human 
terms. While this short work clearly develops Simmel’s approach through reference 
to Latour, Deleuze and Guattari, and the influence of non-human philosophy, I think 
that it also raises questions about the relevance of Simmel’s thought to the 
contemporary moment, relating specifically to the ethics of humanism, post-
humanism, and non-humanism and the problem of moving beyond what we might 
call the limit of the anthropocene. Reversing this focus on the future, in his recent 
book The Simmelian Legacy (2018) Pyyhtinen’s concern is with Simmel’s past and 
his place in the history of the discipline of sociology itself. In this respect we might 
say that The Simmelian Legacy is about exploring what Simmel left behind for future 
readers to understand their contemporary and tracing the hidden pre-history of what 
might eventually become a potential more-than-human sociology. Pyyhtinen’s 
question is, therefore, about what in Simmel’s work lives on beyond the boundary of 
his death and can contribute to understandings of the present. This is ultimately a 
question about the future.  
 
In order to unearth Simmel’s influence, Pyyhtinen starts by noting the relative 
obscurity of Simmel in the sociological canon, his lack of heirs, and the lack of a 
recognisable Simmelian school. Of course, Simmel saw this coming himself, 
predicting that his work would become ‘cold cash’ for his interpreters who would read 
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fragments, but never recognise the value of his overall project. Despite this view, 
however, Pyyhtinen’s point is to trace the more or less hidden influence of Simmel’s 
work on a range of thinkers from Park through to Latour in order to reveal a kind of 
Simmelian unconscious in the history of sociology that we might excavate to realise 
the idea of infinite relationality and a new vision of the discipline appropriate to 
understanding the present. In what follows I want to read Pyyhtinen’s reading of 
Simmel in order to try to tease out a possible Simmelian ethics for the contemporary 
moment marked by potential catastrophe and endings. Thus my objective is to read 
out from the Simmelian legacy to imagine how we might use his work to understand 
our possible future. 
 
Before exploration of Simmel’s influence upon later sociology, which occupies the 
second half of the book, Pyyhtinen starts by explaining the theoretical value of 
Simmel’s approach. In his view Simmel’s work remains essential for understanding 
the present and challenging dominant models for thinking about the social for three 
key reasons. First (1), he explains that Simmel focuses upon the concrete, seeking 
to understand its place in the wider world, by emphasising second (2), the centrality 
of relationality to existence. For Simmel, there is no unity in itself, but only endless 
interactions that produce formal structures fated to give way to flux, becoming, and 
the dynamic forces of life in turn. In the respect, Pyyhtinen locates the roots of 
Simmel’s ‘philosophical sociology’, and perhaps his central interest for the 
contemporary, in the ways in which his work (3) searches for ‘eternity in the 
everyday’. That is to say that the everyday formal structures that we (humans) 
experience hide the eternity of flux and relationality that, in Simmel’s view, will 
always end up breaking through the boundaries that ensure the (temporary) integrity 
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of form. Philosophy becomes essentially sociological in this respect because of its 
emphasis on the relational nature of being, while sociology is philosophical primarily 
because it relies on a vision of the ontological nature of relationality that comprises a 
kind of sociological unconscious beneath everyday life where ‘we’ (humans) 
experience unitary form and social stability.  
 
Explaining the challenge of Simmel’s sociology, Pyyhtinen notes that relationality is 
never static, but rather endlessly mobile and dynamic, and thus critical of visions of 
the discipline that imagine the social as a container of individuals. Beyond this 
critique of reification, Simmel’s sociology is also unlike Marxist theories inspired by 
Hegelian dialectics, where relations move through history in a logical, reasonable 
manner, simply because there is no plan, and centrally no moment of reconciliation 
in Simmel’s thought. There is no final synthesis, no end of history, at least in 
Pyyhtinen’s reading of Simmel. Instead, Pyyhtinen emphasises the importance of 
‘the third’ in Simmel’s work, which famously takes the form of money in The 
Philosophy of Money (1900 / 2011) and the figure of the stranger in the book, 
Soziologie (1908 / 2009) (also see Simmel, 1972). Although the stranger is often 
thought about in terms of a tendency towards objectification operative in modernity 
or the alienation of urban life, Pyyhtinen’s reading shows how the stranger is also 
representative of Simmel’s wider methodological approach which consists in 
understanding the strangeness and constructedness of everyday life (form) and the 
way this shapes experience and, in his later work, life itself.  
 
Thus we can see how Simmel picks up and develops Kant’s philosophy of 
transcendental idealism and the thing in itself and projects this onto the level of the 
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social where form contrasts with experience or life which is inaccessible in itself. This 
is why, from Simmel’s point of view, it is easy to mistake form for the thing in itself 
and the sociologist must constantly remind themselves that the lens that enables 
them to understand social life (the idea of society) is only ever a (static) 
representation of endless relationality. In Simmel’s universe the relational dimension 
is absolute. As Pyyhtinen (2018) notes, following Bourdieu (1998: 3), ‘the real is 
relational’. While this might lead us to conclude that Simmel reduces the social to 
individual psychology or at least the interaction between individuals experiencing and 
thinking about the social world, Pyyhtinen explains that the point of the idea of 
absolute relationality is to show how the individual is itself a product of social 
interactions before it imagines its own formal integrity and reflects upon the social as 
a thing ‘out there’. The individual is, therefore, also a construct founded upon 
relationality.  
 
Following this point, Pyyhtinen rehearses Simmel’s key a priori for the existence of 
social that show how (formless) experience translates into form, which in the end 
leads us to imagine that society is an objective thing or container that somehow 
‘holds’ individuals. In this way Simmel’s a priori for the existence of social life – (1) 
the generalisation of the other in formal roles that always leave a remainder of 
individuality; (2) the opposition of the social and individual strangeness; and (3) the 
integration of social and individual through vocation – create the conditions for the 
emergence of a radically alienated society, characterised by the atrophy of 
individual, subjective life and the hypertrophy of collective, objective world or what 
Simmel (1911 / 1997) calls ‘the tragedy of culture’. In identifying this process with 
modernity, we might move on to explore Simmel’s work on the city (1903 / 1997), 
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where the alienation of humans from objective culture is writ large, and fashion (1904 
/ 1997), which is about more than clothes and revolves around the dynamics of 
endless change, formation, and what Pyyhtinen (2018) explains in terms of the 
interplay of processes of ‘being, not being, and not yet being’. The point here is that 
the idea of fashion turns off the possibility of being up-to-date (in fashion) in a 
dynamic system that means one is always already out-of-date (out of fashion) and 
caught up endlessly trying to catch up and become fashionable.  
 
In this state of modern dis-ease and dis-comfort, this state of endless ‘not yet being’, 
Simmel’s point is that the only way for individuals to survive is to intellectualise their 
situation and impose distance upon their relationship to the world. In his famous 
essay on the psychology of metropolitan life Simmel (1903 / 1997) captures this 
sense of distance towards the world in what he calls the blasé attitude and connects 
this to the dominance of the money economy, where all sense of content and 
particular quality gives way to form and a universal measure based upon quantitative 
value. Although Simmel thought that this hypertrophy of objective life might open up 
a space for subjectivity and individual life, it must be debatable whether this is the 
case today where the obsession with money that characterises neoliberal culture 
seems to empty every kind of individual qualitative valuation of its purchase upon the 
world in the emergence of what Lupton (2016) calls ‘the quantified or quantitative 
self’. Pyyhtinen clearly recognises this fatal possibility, noting that in Simmel’s theory 
of money there is no value beyond consumer desire and the distance between the 
potential consumer and the object of their desire, but I think he skims over the 
potentially apocalyptic effects of this situation, which Simmel revealed and 
contemporary writers such as Bernard Stiegler (2011, 2012, 2014) have made clear 
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in works concerned with the ongoing crisis of capitalism as a value or belief system. 
In this respect, Gregor Fitzi (2018) is potentially better on the impact of the rise of 
objective culture on individuals who lose all sense of their place in the world than 
Pyyhtinen who tends to skate over the profound problem of money and the reduction 
of all quality to quantitative measure.  
 
It is clear that Simmel recognises the problem of quantity in his explanation of the 
way money becomes the ultimate (empty) object of desire - which is at once infinitely 
desirable because of its lack of quality and at the same time entirely empty of the 
kind of content that might inspire social commitment because of the same void of 
meaning - and that this informs his theory of the nihilism of the money economy. It is 
precisely this theory, where the ultimate means of exchange (and relationality) 
abolishes the possibility of valuable ends and becomes a kind of empty end in itself 
(the only purpose, the only end of money is endless circulation), that I think we find 
in Stiegler (2014) today, though he never refers to Simmel, preferring to lean on 
Weber and the idea of disenchantment. Although Pyyhtinen (2018) never traces 
similarities between Simmel’s work and Stiegler’s critique of late capitalism, these 
are clearly present and demonstrate the contemporary relevance of reading the 
former’s work. For example, in much the same way that Stiegler imagines an anomic 
world of uncontrollable individuals (see Stiegler, 2012) paradoxically bound together 
by a lack of connection, Simmel’s (1903 / 1997) theory of modern, urban, money 
society characterised by suffocating proximity and infinite distance might be seen to 
trace the pre-history of the form of drive-based consumer capitalism Stiegler 
critiques across his works on disbelief and discredit. Where Stiegler (2012, 2016) 
writes of the lonely dis-individual lost in an automatic society, Simmel similarly 
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understands the relationality of loneliness. In the modern money society he explores, 
the condition of individual loneliness is not simply about being on one’s own, not 
about being outside of social relations, but rather concerned with a kind of negative 
relationality, defined by an awareness of the presence of others marked by a 
complete lack of subjective connection (see Pyyhtinen, 2009). The state of 
loneliness is, therefore, essential to what it means to be a stranger and the stranger 
is a kind of archetypal modernist who has the potential to theorise the social on the 
basis of their alienation. This is, of course, Pyyhtinen’s (2018) point about Simmel’s 
strange methodology and I think his key focus for understanding Simmel’s relevance 
to the present.  
 
However, even though Pyyhtinen (2018) notes that we might translate Simmel’s 
essential stranger, the Jew, into the contemporary refugee who exists on the very 
edge of global society, I think that he misses an opportunity to show how we are all 
strange in contemporary society and strangeness is in a sense wired into the very 
nature of social life today. As Sherry Turkle (2011) points out, perhaps the 
fundamental mode of strangeness today is that which we encounter online when we 
engage with others who seem absolutely proximate and ever present, but also 
entirely distant and completely remote. I think this is an important example to raise 
because it illustrates a key point that Pyyhtinen moves on to highlight, which is that 
strangeness is not simply about this, that, or the other outsider identity and 
difference from an insider group defined by sameness, but rather a kind of 
ontological distance hardwired into the mediated nature of the social itself. This is a 
point that Bob Copper (2010) similarly highlights in his study of the notion of distance 
in Simmel’s work, where a degree of separation, alienation, and estrangement are 
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inscribed within the nature of existence. Despite this missed opportunity to think 
about Simmel in the context of online culture, however, Pyyhtinen’s point is well 
made: we are never entirely social, never completely transparent to the other, but 
rather always strange to some essential degree. In its most radical form this sense of 
strangeness emerges from the contrast between the absolutely objective (where the 
other is a thing) and absolutely subjective (where the self cannot see beyond its own 
horizons) ways of being that Simmel thinks ends up characterising modern society.  
 
At this point Pyyhtinen (2018) imagines an alternative, utopian form of relationality 
based upon playful interaction where cynical distance and self-absorption fade 
before a more open mode of being with that recalls his earlier work on the gift (see 
Pyyhtinen, 2016). Unfortunately Pyyhtinen does not develop this section of the book, 
or tease out what Simmelian thought might contribute to political or ethical 
understandings of the present, and the work of thinking through what we might call 
Simmel’s utopianism is left to Tom Kemple (2018) who, I think, picks up on the 
possibility of overcoming strangeness and the separation of objectivity and 
subjectivity in his own recent study of Simmel. In Pyyhtinen’s (2018) case, the failure 
to interrogate or focus on the possibility of a humanised society beyond profane 
objectivity is the result of his intention to outline Simmel’s legacy across the history of 
sociology. But by comparison to the first part of the book, which sets out his 
understanding of Simmel’s over-arching theory and very effectively responds to the 
standard view of the fragmentary nature of his writing, I think this section of the work 
is less successful, primarily because it is not structured by the kind of insight that 
organises Goodstein’s (2017) recent study of Simmel’s liminal relation to the 
disciplinary imagination. Although Pyyhtinen clearly recognises this key point, noting 
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Simmel’s strangeness vis-à-vis sociology early in the book, the structure of the text 
and the compartmentalisation of the historical study of Simmel’s impact upon the 
discipline in the final part of the work, means that it tends to lose momentum and 
become a much more traditional historical study that takes theoretical content and 
disciplinary context separately, rather than together in such a way that uses the 
interaction between content and form to drive the narrative of the work forward to 
really show how Simmel might contribute to understandings of the contemporary or 
future possibilities. In this sense Pyyhtinen never completely reveals Simmel’s 
legacy and centrally leaves the political and ethical potential of his thought for others 
to explore. Moving beyond this section of the article, where I have shown how 
Pyyhtinen roots his reading of Simmel in concepts of relationality and strangeness, 
but never explicitly articulates the ways in which these ideas might inform our 
understandings of the present, in the following section I look to compare and contrast 
Gregor Fitzi (2018) and Tom Kemple (2018) on the basis of their Simmelian ethics 
founded upon on the one hand, individualism and on the other hand, sociability / 
religiosity.  
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III 
 
Simmel’s Individual and Social Ethics 
 
If Pyyhtinen’s (2018) focus is Simmel’s legacy and the ways in which his work has 
been read forward up to Latour and non-human sociology, then Gregor Fitzi’s book, 
The Challenge of Modernity: Simmel’s Sociological Theory (2018) seeks to counter 
readings of Simmel that emphasise the fragmentary nature of his thought (including, 
David Frisby’s (see for example, Frisby, 2014) classic work). In this respect, Fitzi 
seeks to explain the system behind Simmel’s exploration of the fragments of 
modernity and show how his work develops around a critique of objectivity and ethic 
of individual subjectivity. Given this objective, it may appear paradoxical that Fitzi 
starts by explaining that there is no monstrous system in Simmel’s work, but rather 
an endlessly complex web of interactions that build, break, and re-build social forms 
ad infinitum. However, following Pyyhtinen, Fitzi explains that ‘the problem of the 
system’ emerges in Simmel’s work through (1) a theory of the mis-recognition of 
form, which is mistaken for a thing in itself, rather than a complex web of relations 
that are endlessly shifting, and (2) exploration of the consequent process of 
objectification that sees the imagined social thing start to dominate the individuals 
who ultimately founded it. Although Pyyhtinen and Fitzi make the same point in this 
respect, Fitzi tends to place far more emphasis on this issue and essentially makes 
his study of Simmel’s exploration of potential political / ethical responses to this 
situation the centrepiece of his book. According to Fitzi, then, Simmel’s basic 
problem of modernity, what he calls ‘the challenge of modernity’, revolves around 
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responding to the atrophy of individual, subjective culture in the face of the 
hypertrophy of objective culture brought about by the domination of money.  
 
Given this focus, the key innovation of Fitzi’s (2018) book, and what separates it 
from the other recent works on Simmel, is that he explores the psychological impacts 
of the atrophy of subjective culture upon the individual. Against the backdrop of 
emerging Freudianism in the late 19th century and early 20th century, Fitzi shows how 
the problem of Simmel’s individual revolves around (1) their inability to identify with 
the objective social system that seems to tower over them and (2) build a coherent 
sense of self inside these structures which feel increasingly alien and meaningless 
from a human perspective. At this point Fitzi notes Simmel’s concept of ‘lifestyle’ or 
‘styles of life’ (1900 / 2011). Here, the lonely, alienated individual responds to their 
situation in the modern, money economy by seeking to make use of the objects that 
surround them to try to build some sense of self. However, Fitzi explains that 
Simmel’s view of lifestyle and consumer culture in a wider sense is essentially tragic 
by suggesting that it is not possible to create a true sense of self from objects that 
essentially identify one with everybody else who is playing the same game. Thus 
Fitzi shows how Simmel imagined the original mass consumer society comprising 
the identikit figures Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) would later write about in terms 
of the lines of pseudo-individuals endlessly struggling to become somebody in a 
society of nobodies. Although Pyyhtinen (2018) similarly explores the dynamics of 
fashion in Simmel, the real strength of Fitzi’s (2018) work is that he shows how 
Simmel connects the dynamics of fashion, consumer culture, and lifestyle to the 
individual who finds themselves caught in vicious cycle of novelty and boredom that 
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reinforces cynicism, emotional distances, devaluation, and neurasthenia or what 
William James called Americanitis (See Richardson, 2007). 
 
Against the exhaustion of neurasthenia, in Simmel (1904 / 1997) consumerism 
becomes about the endless search for stimulation, difference, and escape from the 
crushing sameness of quantitative objective culture, even though the furious pursuit 
of the new is precisely what causes the burn out of quality into quantity in the first 
place. This is the case because the endless search for newness, which is precisely 
what led Baudelaire to the name ‘modern’, paradoxically ends up burying the new 
under an avalanche of weak novelty that seems like more of the same. Recognising 
this problem Fitzi (2018) raises a key point, which is much less prominent in many 
other studies of Simmel’s work, which is that the endless collapse of individual 
difference into mass indifference in a social system where differentiation relies on 
lifestyle and consumption, causes tension, conflict, and a form of negative 
relationality founded upon distance (on this idea also see Cooper, 2010).  
 
Akin to Pyyhtinen’s (2009, 2018) insight about what we might call ‘relational 
loneliness’ in Simmel’s work, Fitzi’s point here is that it would be a mistake to read 
increases in social tension and conflict in terms of the breakdown of relations, 
because interactions based upon negativity, distance, and competition remain 
absolutely reliant on a sense of a relation between self and other and a ‘sociological 
third’ that defines the parameters of their conflict. In this respect, Fitzi (2018) 
explains that Simmel is the founder of conflict sociology, where conflict refers to 
strained individual interactions, rather than the kind of large scale historical struggles 
found in Marx. Although Fitzi fails to point out that this type of conflictual relationality 
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can translate into a meaningful cultural form to situate the individual in the world, 
which is precisely what we find in contemporary society where leftist and rightist 
movements of all kinds seek to oppose and overturn the cultural nihilism of late 
capitalism where everything comes down to the balance sheet and bottom line, he 
uses this introduce his key focus: Simmel’s individual ethics. While Pyyhtinen (2018) 
tends to overlook Simmel’s focus on the construction of the individual in favour of a 
concern with the potential of relationality shot through with strangeness, Fitzi makes 
the problem of self-making central to this book, explaining that the work of the self 
boils down to finding some reason for living in a world that seems objectively 
meaningless. In this context Fitzi points to Simmel’s work on religion (1902 / 1997; 
also see Simmel, 2013) and art (see his Rembrandt, 1916 / 2005), and shows that 
the work of these cultural forms involves providing a backdrop for the creation of 
coherent individualism and making sense of the fragmentation, complexity, and 
objectivity of the modern. Thus Fitzi’s (2018) key point is that Simmel’s thought 
centres upon responding to the challenge of modernity, which is essentially 
concerned with the reification of social relations in monolithic social forms that 
appear resistant to human meaning-making and identification.  
 
In the teeth of this nightmarish situation that transforms humans into so many objects 
within a system that cannot see beyond objectivity, Fitzi’s (2018) later Simmel (1918 
/ 2015) is focused on working out individual ethics, strategies for self-making, and 
reasons for living that deepen understandings of self-worth in the modern money 
economy where we tend to think about the value of the human in terms of the 
reductive question, ‘how much?’ 
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While Pyyhtinen (2018) tends to focus on the role ‘the third’ in Simmel’s work, 
suggesting that the key principle of his sociology is strangeness, Fitzi emphasises 
the problem of objectivity and the struggle for self-making in a world that endlessly 
empties the self into profane objectivity. In this way I think Fitzi’s Simmel identifies a 
key problem of the contemporary moment, which concerns the sense in which 
monolithic social forms (globalisation, the anthropocene) leave the individual feeling 
helpless, hopeless, and unable to transform their social world, and the consequent 
challenge of the (post-)modern, which resides in constructing forms of individuality 
robust enough to think positively about potential change in the face of a (globalised) 
system that is, on the one hand, totally human (the anthropocene), but on the other 
hand, entirely post-human and alien to subjective concerns about existence and life 
itself, which, of course, reside on the other side of basic economic calculations. 
However, the issue with this focus on the individual and the attempt to assert 
individualism in the face of a monolithic system that seems hardened to the needs of 
the self is that it tends to preclude the possibility of social change and in this way 
may reflect the problem of late capitalism, where the key conflict centres upon the 
struggle for individual difference in a world marked by economic indifference. 
 
In this respect Tom Kemple (2018) extends Fitzi’s (2018) concern with the challenge 
of modernity and individualism by reading Simmel in terms of a sociological ethics of 
what we might call ‘humanised form’ that avoids the extremes of narcissism and 
reification. Thus the real value of Kemple’s work is founded in the way that he 
focuses upon Simmel’s attempt to overcome the separation of modern objective and 
subjective culture and in a sense develops a reading of Simmel’s ‘religiosity’ (1902 / 
1997; 2013) or even mysticism of wholeness, where self and society come together 
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in a comprehensive unitary form (see Vandenberghe, 2010). Here, Kemple’s work 
focuses on emphasising Simmel’s social, rather than individual, ethics and contrasts 
Pyyhtinen’s (2018) view that there is nothing beyond Simmel’s strangeness by 
suggesting that his stark opposition between subjective and objective culture 
necessarily conjures a utopian vision of a comprehensive culture able to balance 
experience and form without lapsing into either absolute flux or inflexible structure. 
By focusing on Simmel’s interpretations of the built environment, and particularly the 
ideas of the door and the bridge (also see Kemple, 2007 on this point), the central 
point of Kemple’s interpretation of Simmel is, therefore, to explore how he moves 
from an exploration of individual life to an understanding of social totality and then 
centrally a consideration of how this totality might be made more humane. In this 
respect, Kemple’s (2018) work also contrasts with Fitzi’s (2018) study, which tends 
to prioritise individualism and present Simmel as a kind of proto-existentialist. Where 
Fitzi’s main concern is Simmel’s focus on the self and the survival of the individual in 
a world of objects, Kemple seeks to situate the individual in some kind of social 
totality in the name of overcoming the opposition between the experience of the 
lonely, self-enclosed self and the idea of reified social form impervious to human 
interests.  
 
In order to situate the self in society and suggest ways to start to overcome the 
opposition between subjective and objective culture, Kemple (2018) sets out what he 
calls Simmel’s ‘geometry of social relations’. Through this idea Kemple seeks to map 
Simmel’s spatial sociology by sketching horizontal (relational), diagonal (typification 
and strangeness, where the individual is in / out of society), and vertical (vocation 
and the link between individual and society) lines that come together to create the 
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image of a door that represents the possibility of a passage from a world marked by 
the alienation of self from society to a new social form that balances subjective and 
objective culture and recognises experience in a new comprehensive, unitary, and 
most importantly humane society. Although Kemple is not explicit about the 
methodological value of Simmel’s architectural metaphors - the door that represents 
the liminality of relationality and the bridge that suggests the possibility of moving 
between states of sociability – I take it that the purpose of these images is to show 
that it is possible to subject the endless flux and transformations of modernity to 
some kind of mapping procedure in order to make sense and imagine a future where 
society is more than an imaginary monolith that towers over humans who cower 
before its structures. The irony of this procedure is, of course, that it was precisely 
these kind of efforts to capture the dynamism of modernity in formal structures that, 
in Simmel’s view, eventually led to the emergence of the in- / post-human systems 
that started to undermine subjective culture in the first place. In light of this paradox, 
Kemple’s (2018) challenge is to theorise the creation of forms that hold onto quality 
and human value, rather than abandon these to quantity, number, and objectivity, 
and imagine a form of relationality that remains on a human scale. I think that he 
manages to achieve this and find the possibility of humanised social form in his 
theological reading of Simmel’s work that imagines the possibility of a negative 
religion without God (Vandenberghe, 2010). 
 
Seeking a strange third way somewhere between paranoid individualism and 
monolithic social form, Kemple (2018) turns to Simmel’s work on money and shows 
how the economy has essentially replaced religion as the modern God (also see 
Blumenberg, 2012, on this point concerning the relationship between money and 
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life). In Heideggerian (1977) language, we might say that the idea of the money 
economy has become a completely realised worldview, ‘a world picture’ based upon 
a modern ontotheological system of thought, meaning that money simultaneously 
participates in social life on the most essential level (ontology) and stands above the 
world as a kind of ultimate organising principle (theology). In order to demonstrate 
this point Kemple refers to the idea of the coin toss. Although we might imagine that 
the coin toss represents the ultimate expression of contingency (surely the stock 
market shows that money is modern chance, contingency, movement?), Kemple 
shows that the very use of the monetary medium to capture the expression of the 
state of fundamental uncertainty, which we might think is written into existence itself 
(think Andre Breton’s surrealistic idea of chance from Nadja (1999)), essentially 
cancels possibility by placing it under the rule of (a) state sovereignty (which 
guarantees the value of the coin) and perhaps more importantly (b) the regime of 
meaningless objective exchange, where the arbitrary decision between heads or tails 
effectively mirrors the purely quantitative distinction between more or less value, 
devoid of external support, reference, or significance (quality).  
 
In this respect what we might take for an ontology of chance and contingency is 
seriously restricted by the parameters of the money economy, objectivity, and 
meaninglessness which, for example, precludes the type of interpretations the 
surrealists sought to develop in the 1920s and 1930s, where chance opens up new 
worlds and new ways of understanding. Thus the problem of modernity in Kemple’s 
(2018) reading of Simmel resides in finding some way to step outside of the 
ontotheological system of money and objectivity in the name of a different world 
centred upon respect for subjectivity, experience, significance, and meaningful 
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human life. Although Kemple does not set out a comprehensive theory for shifting 
between these two worlds (objective and subjective) and passing through the door or 
over bridge to utopia, his focus on relationality and reference to Simmel’s influence 
on Martin Buber (1986) who famously contrasted the objective world of ‘I-It’ 
connections to the truly social world of ‘I-Thou’ relations, suggests that the route 
towards a Simmelian utopia resides in a new kind of humanism and religion of com-
passion for the other based upon ‘our’ universal vulnerability and need to lean on 
social relations to live (see Simmel, 2013, also Vandenberghe, 2010).    
 
Expanding upon the points made about the relationality of loneliness and conflict in 
Simmel’s work by Pyyhtinen and Fitzi, Kemple’s (2018) basic point is that humans 
are never outside of social relations, even though this is precisely what the 
hypertrophy of the objective money economy might lead them to imagine. The 
reason for this is that the monetary universe’s emphasis on the bare object and base 
objectivity tends to provoke a defensive reaction from the individual who seeks to 
resist objectification in such a way that obscures the essential sociability of the 
human whose humanness rests very precisely on the way ‘they’ make worlds with 
others in cooperation and conflict. What is lost, therefore, in the strained opposition 
between post-human social form (the hypertrophy of the system) and the desperate 
individual determined to separate themselves from a system set on their 
objectification (the atrophy of the individual) is the essential sociability of the human, 
which is precisely what Kemple looks to rescue by foregrounding Simmel’s 
sociological / theological ethics (see Simmel’s work on religion, 1902 / 1997; 2013). 
Although the religiosity of this ethical turn is not really made explicit in Kemple’s 
book, in my reading what he proposes is the replacement of Mammon, Thomas 
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Carlyle’s God of money (McCarraher, 2019), with the basic principle of com-passion 
founded in Simmel’s key idea of the relation, and the elevation of this notion to the 
level of a Platonic idea or utopian concept. But how would this transition happen? In 
terms of bridging these two worlds, we might refer to Nigel Dodd’s (2012) work on 
Simmel’s utopian idea of money, which is essentially concerned with shifting the 
principle of difference from money (more or less) to the individual (who is rendered 
entirely indifferent in the money society) in order to create a society that, to coin a 
contemporary phrase, puts ‘people before profit’. The value of introducing this theory 
into Kemple’s proposal for emphasising Simmel’s social ethics is that it offers a way 
to shift from objective to subjective culture within the money economy itself and 
consequently open up a space for the kind of com-passionate social form that 
Kemple suggests, with the qualification that it would also be a good idea to 
repurpose the Hebrew’s prohibition on graven images in order to prevent the ideal of 
religious com-passion finding form in some profane representational object or other 
that ends up devaluing humanity over again.   
 
Although Kemple (2018) does not situate his reading of Simmel in the context of 
contemporary social concerns, there is no doubt that his opposition of a potential 
utopian social form based upon human com-passion and soulfulness (see Harrington 
and Kemple, 2012; Mannheim, 2012) and an actual reified, objective, post-human 
monetary system where the only question is ‘how much?’, speaks to current issues 
relating to the violence of late capitalism, humanism / non-humanism, the 
relationship between humanity and the environment, and the problem of the 
anthropocene. While it might initially appear that Kemple’s interpretation of Simmel is 
out of time in terms of its focus upon the plight of the human (surely, we are all post- 
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or non-human now?), I would argue that the kind of humanism he outlines through 
his reading of Simmel’s sociology of relationality is characterised less by the 
Prometheanism and scientism that has led to the radical alienation of humanity from 
nature, the emergence of the anthropocene, and related ecological catastrophism we 
live with today, and more by a religious vision of the human that emphasises 
vulnerability, dependence, and humility before others, whether these others are 
human or non-human forms of life. Against the humanism of the Promethean and 
liberal traditions, which valorises the human and considers everything in the world 
ripe for ‘his’ colonisation, I think the humanism of Kemple’s Simmel is on the side of 
the later Heidegger (1977), who was critical of technology, techno-science, and the 
transformation of the natural world into a thing or standing reserve to be used and 
abused in the name of progress. In line with Heidegger’s concern with ‘letting be’ or 
‘restraining the will’ (see Bret Davis, 2006, on Heidegger’s idea of the will), I would 
make the case that the humanism of Kemple’s Simmel is a humanism of limits, 
smallness, and immersion in the whole, where the idea of ‘the whole’ may be 
understood in a variety of ways including those involving theories of religious 
communities or ecological systems. Building upon this idea, in the final, concluding 
section of the article I want to tease out the ecological ethics of Kemple’s 
(non)humanistic Simmel through reference to David Beer’s (2019) recent work on 
the late Simmel in order to suggest that the key contemporary value of reading 
Simmel today resides in a recognition of what we might call his non-human 
humanism.  
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IV 
 
Simmel’s (Non)Humanism 
 
Read in terms of the coordinates of Chernilo’s (2017) debate about the nature of the 
human, we might conclude that if Kemple’s (2018) Simmel is more Heideggerian in 
the sense that his concern is with a soulful humanism of relationality and being-in-
the-world, Fitzi’s (2018) Simmel might be more Sartrean in respect of his focus upon 
the individual’s profound alienation from society and need to develop a project for 
life. However, following Pyyhtinen (2018) we know that the classic Simmelian move 
is to focus on the ‘third’, which would involve looking to the contrast inside this 
(oppositional) relation and emphasising the strangeness or critical tension within the 
duality of positions (in this case Fitzi / Kemple). Now I think that this tension is 
precisely what we encounter when we read Beer’s (2019) work on Simmel’s final 
books. Somewhere between my readings of Fitzi and Kemple, I want to make the 
case that Beer’s work represents a kind of ‘strange third’ marked by tension precisely 
because it considers Simmel’s final books – his Rembrandt (1916 / 2005) and The 
View of Life (1918 / 2015) – in their proper historical context (1914-1918) scarred by 
apocalyptic endings / beginnings / and possible futures. For Beer, we cannot 
overlook this context when reading Simmel’s final works because in a sense these 
books are marked by his experience of this period of historical and personal crisis, 
or, we might say using religious language, apocalypse that in many respects might 
be seen to reflect the radical division between (a) the progress of a Promethean 
society where technological objectivity produces the kind of existential reaction that 
would later inform Sartrean (1947 / 2007) thought (Fitzi’s reading of Simmel’s 
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individualism) and (b) a completely different vision of life where relationality is 
everything and what techno-science misses in its obsessive focus on the object is 
the ontological truth of participation, implication, and responsibility hardwired into 
existence (Kemple’s reading on Simmel’s religiosity).    
 
In my view the true novelty of Beer’s (2019) reading of Simmel’s final works resides 
in his identification of the way in which these books speak to the moment of historical 
and personal crisis marked by World War I and Simmel’s own impending death and 
the sense in which these moments of crisis mirror our own historical predicament 
characterised by looming ecological catastrophe, extinction, and what Zizek (2010) 
writes about in terms of ‘the end times’. It is clear that Kemple’s book similarly 
speaks to contemporary concerns, in respect of the way he reads Simmel’s ethical 
thought in terms of an apocalyptic choice between the nightmare of the objective 
money economy and the possibility of religious society of relationality inspired by 
vulnerability, com-passion, and soulfulness, but what Beer (2019) brings to the table 
is a focus on the implication of these very human concerns within non-human 
processes centred upon life, existence, death, and the work of extinction. In this 
respect the key contribution of Beer’s reading of Simmel’s final works written 
between 1914-1918 is to show that it was in this period that Simmel transformed his 
sociology of the relation and its organisation in social structures into a full blown 
philosophy of the dynamism of life and temporary formation inspired by the 
lebensphilosophie of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Bergson (also see Pyyhtinen 
(2012) in this regard).  
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In this reading of Simmel’s work the impact of profound historical and personal crisis 
led him to project his sociology of mobile relations and temporary formation into a 
philosophy of life and death, where the end represents a kind of limit that enables 
organisms to construct meaningful forms that reflect a sense of the infinite value of 
life itself. According to Beer, this is how we should read Simmel’s Rembrandt (1916 / 
2005), which focuses on the way art can impose form upon the endless flows of life 
and in this respect make sense of what might appear otherwise senseless. 
Expanding upon this idea, Beer explains that Simmel see Rembrandt’s work in terms 
of (a) the formal convergence of past events in the present, (b) the ways in which 
objective processes impact upon subjective life, (c) movement finds stability in form, 
and finally (d) life runs up against the limits of death. Thus Simmel reads 
Rembrandt’s paintings, such as The Storm on the Sea of Galilee, as synecdoches 
capable of revealing the tensions between life and form and movement and stability 
that his early work interprets on a purely sociological level, but he now imagines are 
representative of ontological processes founded in the nature of existence itself 
(Gross, 2001).  
 
Following Simmel’s own death of liver cancer in 1918, the Futurists would, of course, 
make use of art to represent modern mobility and endless change, but there is, I 
think, a significant difference between what Marinetti and others (for example, 
Umberto Boccioni) wanted to represent and what Simmel saw in Rembrandt’s works 
of the 17th century. Where the Futurists celebrated the movement, speed, and in a 
sense the anonymous flows of life that symbolise the death of every form, organism, 
and structure, Simmel’s Rembrandt is more about recognising the limit of death in 
order to reflect upon the fragile beauty and limitless value of life in temporary form 
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capable of inspiring the creation of human meaning and significance beyond the 
violence of life in itself. In respect of their love for the violence of life stripped bare, 
the Futurists would more likely identify with the anonymous flows of Simmel’s money 
economy where meaning disappears before bare objectivity, while the conclusion 
Simmel himself reaches in Rembrandt is that life only takes on value inside the 
formal structures that make it matter precisely because they have and are made by 
their limits. This is, in his language, the true significance of ‘the metaphysics of 
death’ (see Simmel, 1910 / 2007). As Simmel (1918 / 2015: 69) explains in his final 
work, ‘death…appears as the shaper of life’. 
  
This understanding of the value of death is, of course, a lesson we can also learn 
from Borges’ (2000) short story The Immortal where Borges imagines what endless 
life would look like. While we might imagine immortal creatures displaying the 
highest levels of intellectual and cultural development and so on, Borges reveals of 
truth of endless life in the slovenly immortals who have degenerated to the level of 
the lowest beasts, precisely because they have no limits, no future, no reason to do 
anything. The key point of this example is, therefore, that life takes on meaning only 
when we become aware of the ‘border of death’ and we can only think significant 
thoughts on the basis of our ignorance of what lay on the other side. Following 
Heidegger (2010) who saw that authenticity relied on what he called being-towards-
death, Simmel (1918 / 2015) was led to the conclusion that life matters most when it 
teeters on the brink, when it runs up against the edge of death, and we face looming 
catastrophe and potential apocalypse (World War I and his own failing health), where 
the Greek word ‘apocalypsis’ means ‘revealing’ or ‘uncovering’. Thus the borderline 
(See Simmel, 1908 / 2007), the dividing line between two states, is key in Simmel’s 
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final works. Indeed, Beer (2019) very skilfully explains this over the course of his 
book and in particular when he reflects upon Simmel’s concept of ‘world’, which 
refers to the symbolic forms we live through in the name of making sense. 
 
Given this reading of Simmel’s final works, we might conclude that the key problem 
of the present is founded in the violence of late capitalist global economy, which has 
colonised life itself and subjected every meaningful form to the necessity to move for 
the sake of circulation and what Simmel (1918 / 2015) calls ‘more life’. What should 
be clear, however, from the above is that in the Simmelian universe the issue with 
the wholesale identification with life and ‘more life’ is that it also represents the death 
of ‘more than life’, the death of form, the death of significance, and in a sense the 
death of death itself. Although we might imagine that the effort to eliminate death 
represents a positive move, Beer (2019) explains that the hypertrophy of life and the 
atrophy of form reflects the way in which the human world ‘wounds’ and destroys 
itself to free anonymous post-human flows. Against the endless transformations of 
life in itself (endless circulation, metabolism), Beer’s ‘late Simmel’ looks to embrace 
the limit of death in order to impose some meaningful form upon ‘the quantitative 
vastness of existence’. In this way Beer shows how Simmel suggests the 
construction of worlds able to make life matter and provides his reader with a model 
of read Simmel into the non-humanism of the contemporary moment. Reflecting 
upon the excessive nature of communication in the hyper-connected, hyper-related 
society, Beer (2019) notes that we need to find ways to make sense and build 
worlds. However what he does not do is extend this theory of the need for what we 
might call worlding to an exploration of the violence of the global money economy 
and the politics of post- / non- / more-than- / humanism.  
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In my view the problem of the politics of post- / non- / more-than / humanism is the 
key to understanding the relevance of Simmel’s work today. As we have seen above, 
the central issue of the global money economy, particularly under the political 
ideology of neoliberalism where everything is understood in economic terms (See 
Davies (2014) on this point), is that the identification with anonymous flows destroys 
any understanding of limits and endings that might enable the formation of a 
meaningful world able to shape the future. Even though it might be the case that this 
situation sprang from the philosophy of humanism, a humanism of the Godlike 
nature of the human vis-à-vis the rest of existence that becomes a Heideggerian 
(1977) ‘standing reserve’, the truth is that it is has now transgressed itself in the 
emergence of a violent technological post-humanism that identifies with the 
anonymous flows of life beyond the formal limits of anything we might call ‘human’. 
This violent transformation of humanism into post-humanism is, of course, behind 
the economic ideas of endless growth, endless work, and endless profit founded 
upon a liberal, capitalist fantasy that flows of life are in themselves infinite, limitless, 
and endlessly open for exploitation, monetisation, and capitalisation. Despite the 
apocalypticism of Swedish Teenagers, School strikes, and social movements 
(Extinction Rebellion), this vision of limitlessness persists in the institutions of late 
capitalism.  
 
Against this vision of what we might call post-human humanism characterised by a 
valorisation of (a) the money economy, (b) biological process, (c) the anonymous 
flows of life, (d) the death of form, and finally (e) the death of death itself, what I think 
we should take from Kemple’s (2018) ‘theological Simmel’ and Beer’s (2019) 
‘catastrophic Simmel’ is a theory of the value of a different kind of humanism, 
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perhaps a non-human humanism, organised around a recognition that there is 
nothing special about human beings in the scheme of life in itself, that we are limited, 
vulnerable, and only survive on the basis of our necessary immersion in an socio-
eco-system defined by relationality and openness to other forms of life (where is it 
important to emphasise the idea of a form of life) (Gross, 2001). Ultimately, what I 
take from my readings of Simmel and his contemporary commentators (and I am 
particularly inspired by Pyyhtinen and his use of Deleuze and Guattari at this point) is 
that it is possible to read a major Simmel into future as a theorist of infinite 
relationality, and say that this makes him important for understanding our place in a 
globalised world, but that it is also necessary to consider the minor Simmel of the 
necessity of limits, because it is only by recognising limits that we might create space 
to build meaningful worlds able to shape the future. In this respect I think we should 
supplement the more traditional understandings of Simmel (the major Simmel, the 
modern theorist of relationality and the infinite movement of life) with a theory of a 
minor Simmel as a post-modern theorist of death and, where the present is 
concerned, extinction. Exploring Simmel through his ‘limit-thinking’ might shed light 
on the humility and com-passion embedded in what I want to call his humble non-
human humanism and reveal the value of reading and re-reading his work for the 
present scarred by looming catastrophe and the future that seems increasingly 
difficult to shape.           
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